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The article was devoted to the problem of creation of «developmental institutions» multilevel system 
in the Russian economy. «Developmental institutions’» criteria and objects were defined. Also groups 
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subjects» should also have had powerful bargaining positions and political will to produce selective 
incentives for «developmental agents».
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Introduction
The problem of the Russian economy 
transition to the innovation-led model of 
economic growth is widely discussed in the 
Russian government and in the academic 
establishment. Necessity of such transition is 
regarded as crucial because there are no any 
other alternatives. Present model of economic 
development was based on low inner prices on 
oil and natural gas whereas world prices were 
high enough. Also this model included untapped 
industrial reserves, qualified and relatively 
inexpensive labor resources. On the other 
hand, gradual reduction of difference between 
currency exchange level and Russian ruble 
purchasing power parity, depletion of untapped 
industrial reserves and infrastructural limits 
for further economic growth, labor forces rise 
in prices and insufficient mobility of qualified 
personnel, strengthening of competition on 
inner and outer markets of goods and services 
had leaded to the situation when further 
development of the Russian economy based on 
this economic resources became impossible. 
Also this problem has special urgency in the 
context of the world financial-economic crisis 
which compels less economically effective 
companies to leave market and gives a chance 
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to develop for those economic agents who open 
up new technologies and use rationally available 
economic resources.
Obviously more crucial problem is a problem 
to disclose subjects of the Russian economy 
modernization who are able to choose a strategy 
of transition and who are able to realize innovative 
scenario of economic development. That is why it 
is supposed to give definitions for such conceptions 
as «agent» and «subject» of economic development 
in this article, as well as to define conditions which 
allow us speaking about groups of interests in this 
context. Specificity and objects of interested groups 
will be identified using the example of creating 
multilevel system of «developmental institutions» 
of the Russian economy.
«Developmental Institutions»  
of the Russian Economy:  
Criteria, Objects and Functions
«Developmental institutions» are 
organizational-economic structures that have 
enough capabilities to realize a new potential of 
economic growth. For instance, they can attract 
investments in infrastructure, in developing 
branches and in human capital, as well as they 
can assist to create new technologies and to 
heighten competitiveness of home small and 
medium business. Effect from «developmental 
institutions» is much higher rather than the 
size of the state investments because they serve 
as long-term state commitments to develop 
national economy and this fact causes stability of 
expectations in private sector.
The following criteria distinguish 
«developmental institutions» from other forms of 
state supporting:
Developmental institutions» have stable • 
organizational structure and definite rules 
of their activity.
«Developmental institutions» do not have • 
object to maximize profits. Classical 
«developmental institutions» are non-
commercial organizations and their 
creation is connected with production of 
quasi public goods with localized positive 
externalities1.
«Developmental institutions» activity • 
is consisting in resources allocation 
(finances, qualified personnel, 
information, administrative capital) in 
the developmental projects.
Deceleration of the growth based on 
the traditional economic structure causes the 
necessity to create these organizational-economic 
structures. «Developmental institutions» are 
catalyst of innovative activity. To guarantee 
profits for innovators that are not available in old 
institutional environment is one of their primary 
object. It is important to point out that there are 
«developmental institutions» failures, for instance: 
inflexibility in changing conditions, lack of clear 
development strategy, absence of trust in private 
sector, «lock-in» jeopardy in the frames of existing 
institutional environment, private business ousting 
from investment process, risk of costs overstating.
Also a considerable concentration of 
financial resources that are being attracted during 
the creation of «developmental institutions» may 
become one of the failure reasons. For instance, 
there is danger of political rent extraction by 
different groups of interests2. Political rent 
extraction may reduce the effectiveness of 
implantation of institutional innovation. The 
important moment is to distinct corruption rent 
and political rent itself.
Corruption is the sale by government 
officials of government property for personal 
1 Construction and reconstruction of engineering and so-
cial infrastructure units on the bounded territory are ex-
amples of localized positive quasi public goods produc-
ing during the creation of Kuzbass Technological park.
2 For instance, it is planned to apportion 300 million 
rubles from federal budget and 413 million rubles from 
regional budget to create Kuzbass technological park 
during 2008 – 2010.
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gain [Fischer, 2004; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993]. 
It is an illegal activity to search and to extract 
rent. In other words, politicians and officials on 
the one hand, and entrepreneurs on the other 
hand interplay in the frames of the «black» zone. 
On the contrary, political rent is extracted in the 
frames of the «white» zone. It is well-known 
fact that process of lobbying of different groups 
interests is regulated with the special law, i.e. 
lobbying is separated from corruption and does 
not have any connections with State servants and 
politicians bribery. Its extraction prerequisites 
arise in the case when separate market participant 
can limit artificially access to the local market 
for newcomers. That is why this participant can 
obtain resources those are not corresponding with 
his level of economic efficiency. Such domination 
of the tendency to extract political rent may lead to 
the common reduction of efficiency on the macro 
level. Thus this domination can predetermine 
the inevitability of crisis of the system resources 
allocation among economic agents. According to 
this fact, A. Krueger noted: «…in many market-
oriented economies, government restrictions 
upon economic activity are pervasive facts of life. 
These restrictions give rise to rents of a variety 
of forms, and people often compete for the rents. 
Sometimes, such competition is perfectly legal. 
In other instances, rent seeking takes other forms, 
such as bribery, corruption, smuggling, and black 
markets» [Krueger, 1974, p. 291].
Nevertheless, there are successful patterns 
of «developmental institutions» of economy in the 
foreign countries. For instance, Chile Fondacion, 
venture program «Inbal» in Israel, Finnish 
National Fund for Research and Development 
(SITRA), Korean Development Institute. Like 
international experience shows «developmental 
institutions» are successful when (1) share 
of the State does not exceed of 40 – 50 %; (2) 
there is a transparent scheme of «developmental 
institutions» managing; (3) State is regarded as a 
subject, who gives only initial impulse for further 
development. But in many cases successful 
institutional patterns are unique for this or that 
country.
To define peculiarities of the Russian 
«developmental institutions» system it is crucial 
to disclose agents of economic development 
who can create such system. Moreover it is 
very important to find out real «developmental 
subjects» who are interested indeed in realization 
of transition to the innovation-led model of 
economic development.
Agents and Subjects  
of Economic Development
Contents of such categories as «subject», 
«agent» and «actor» are not equal. Conception of 
«actor» is meaningful in the context of concrete 
social action1, while conception of «subject» 
reflects rationality of behavior and ability to 
realize free choice. Subject becomes an actor 
according to some social action, but actor can be 
regarded as subject only in the context of definite 
behavior characteristics. Essential characteristics 
of subjectiveness are the following (Fig. 1).
(1) Presence of own strategic or tactical 
project that realize own (not external) interests 
and objects.
(2) Presence of political will and powerful 
bargaining position to realize own project.
These or that individuals and social groups 
are able to be actors but they are instruments 
to achieve external, not their own, interests 
[Gaman-Golutvina, 2007]. Actors who are 
able to implement activity that leads to definite 
changes can be regarded as «agents». According 
to this idea, construct the following scheme of 
the contemporary modernization process using 
subjectiveness strengthening:
1 Also actor plays definite social role, which is considered 
to be relatively stable pattern of behavior that is realized 
by individual according to the social status or the social 
position in society.
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Developmental agents are groups of 
interests whose actions are implemented 
to create contemporary instruments of 
structural policy (for instance, «developmental 
institutions»), as well as they have necessary 
resources and their economic interests come 
to the common ground. Also these groups 
of interests should have wide supporting of 
society and other groups of interests. Selective 
incentives have an influence upon participants 
of these groups to produce collective goods, for 
instance – economic development based on the 
led-innovation model.
As we can see not all developmental agents 
are real «developmental subjects». Groups of 
interests are characterized with different horizons 
of planning (short-term, middle-term and long-
term), as well as these groups have unequal 
bargaining positions and they are characterized 
with presence or absence of political will 
(political will is regarded as specific resource 
using to create selective incentives). According 
to this idea, «developmental subjects» of the 
national economy are groups with long-term 
interests, which have objects and resources not 
only to achieve these objects but also to create 
selective incentives for other groups of interests 
(i.e. for developmental agents). The following 
characteristics of «developmental subjects» are:
(1) object availability;
(2) availability of instruments to achieve this 
object;
(3) availability of resources (political, 
administrative and symbolic capitals1), those are 
base for object achieving.
It is crucial to disclose peculiarities of the 
«developmental institutions» Russian model in the 
context of «developmental subjects» definition.
Peculiarities of the Russian Economy  
«Developmental Institutions»  
System Creation: Federal and Regional Levels
Russia is a country with historically formed 
social and economic differentiation, which 
predetermines: (1) various possibilities for 
economic development of the Russian regions; 
(2) segmented institutional environment, i.e. 
variation of multitudes of fundamental political, 
social and juridical rules, which regulate 
economic and political activity in this or that 
region; (3) localized institutional agreements, i.e. 
various agreements between economic agents of 
this or that region, which regulate methods of its 
competition [Levin, 2008].
The Russian economic space peculiarities 
predetermine the fact that creating «developmental 
1 Political capital is economic agent ability to mobilize 
collective actions and to represent interests of other eco-
nomic agents (groups and/or individuals). Administrative 
capital is economic agent ability to regulate resources 
access for other economic agents using special positions 
of power and authority. Symbolic capital is economic 
agent ability to manipulate with different methods to 
evaluate available and potential resources. See: V.V. Ra-
daev Conception of capital, forms of capital and their 
convertibility, Economic sociology, 3 (4) (2002), 20-33, 
in Russian.
Actor
(social role) 
Agent (social 
role + ability 
to realize 
changes)
Subject
(social role + ability 
to realize changes + 
presence of political 
will and powerful 
bargaining position) 
Individual
(group)
Fig. 1. Strengthening of individual (group) subjectiveness
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institutions» system must become multilevel 
because federal, regional and local authorities are 
interested in its creation. Each level pursuits its 
own object, has its own resources and instruments 
to achieve these object.
Federal «Developmental Subjects»
Federal level of developmental agents is 
represented with superior political elite, federal 
bureaucracy, federal large-scale companies, 
sectoral scientific institutes, expert community 
(as a rule, these are intellectual elites of both 
capitals) and net of federal universities. Real 
«developmental subjects» are superior political 
elite, federal bureaucracy and federal large-scale 
companies.
Superior political elite’s object is to solve 
interconnected problems: social and economic 
development of the country territory, supporting 
its defensive capacities, «incorporation» 
of the Russian economy into global world-
wide economy. Superior political elite has 
strategic resource1 that allows to raise above 
other developmental «subjects» and agents 
[Kryshtanovskaya, 2004].
To solve these problems superior 
political elite delegates authority to the federal 
bureaucracy. The latter fulfils some measures 
that to improve living standards for population, 
to create comfortable conditions for habitation, 
to assist for human capital development and to 
realize large-scale developmental projects with 
the help of definite structural policy instruments. 
One of these instruments are federal financial 
and non-financial «developmental institutions», 
which are represented with Investment Fund of 
the Russian Federation, JSC «Russian Venture 
Company», JSC «Special Economic Zones», 
JSC «Russian agricultural bank», JSC «Russian 
1 It is supposed that this resource includes political, ad-
ministrative and symbolic capitals, which are incom-
mensurable with the corresponding capitals of all other 
«developmental subjects».
investment fund of informational-communicative 
technologies» and with State Corporations2. 
Main objects of these organizational-economic 
structures are: modern infrastructure formation, 
implementation of innovations, development of 
export of the products with high added value, 
supporting of small and medium business, 
reduction of regional disproportions, development 
of the agricultural sector [Nabiullina, 2007]. To 
achieve these objects federal bureaucracy has 
resources – administrative and symbolic capitals 
(those capitals have superior potential than 
corresponding capitals of regional authorities), 
which allow to redistribute funds of federal 
budget that is formed owing to raw material 
exporting rent.
It is worth mentioning that bureaucracy 
aspires to satisfy their own interest during 
implementation of their functions. This interest 
is differing from superior political elite’s 
interest and from private economic agents’ 
interests. This corporative interest is concluded 
in economic resources concentration and in 
financial streams regulation that guarantees 
the increase of economic and political power of 
State bureaucratic apparatus [Kurbatova et al., 
2005].
Federal large-scale companies’ object is 
to participate in the wide-scale developmental 
projects and to receive various State preferences 
and breaks in the frames of «developmental 
institutions» formation. In this case there are 
some risks and effectiveness of federal large-
scale business participation is questionable. 
The following reasons are: opacity of creating 
State corporations, federal officials’ tendency 
to extract political rent, opportunity to receive 
economic resources by ineffective economic 
agents via political and bureaucratic markets, 
strong dependence from world prices on energy 
2 At the present time there are eight State Corporations in 
the Russian Federation.
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resources. Furthermore, certainly unequal 
positions of business and State on the federal 
level may cause the situation when the State 
itself will choose developmental projects and will 
appoint participants for projects financing. At the 
same time federal government is not able to select 
adequate measures to stimulate economic growth 
because of information asymmetry problem that 
often predetermines incorrect understanding 
of motives and incentives of companies that 
have higher level of adaptation for various 
innovations.
Federal large-scale companies’ instrument to 
achieve their object is lobbying of their interests in 
the frames of wide-scale developmental projects1. 
Economic capital in the form of financial funds 
that are gained because of raw materials (natural 
gas, oil, wood, metals and others) exporting is the 
resource of the federal large-scale companies to 
lobby their interests. Also these companies use 
cumulative political capital.
«Federal Center – Regions» Relations  
in the Process  
of «Developmental Institutions» Creation
Regional authorities are situated in more rigid 
conditions than Federal Center. They experience 
pressure «vertically» – from federal authorities, 
and «horizontally» – from neighboring territories 
(republics, regions, krays). «Federal Center – 
Regions» relations can be divided into two main 
phases (Table 1).
Absence of clear formal rules characterized 
«weak Center – powerful Regions» relations 
because of social-economic collapse and political 
disintegration. Redistribution of federal budget 
1 It is worth mentioning that State companies and State 
corporations are also lobbying their interests. For in-
stance, State enterprise «Rosoboronexport» is interested 
in creation of special economic zone «Titanium valley» 
on the base of corporation VSMPO-AVISMA; State 
Corporation «Rostechnologies» is interested in getting 
assets of independent engines building enterprise «Sa-
lut».
funds was the only real key factor for federal 
government to influence on governors. That 
is why the process of redistribution of federal 
budget funds became a center of competition. 
Interbudget relations became a sphere of bargain 
between regional leaders and Federal Center that 
personified various groups of interests in the 
frames of bureaucratic market. These groups of 
interests widely used informal norms of personified 
nature to «beat out» subventions, State subsidies, 
and transfers. Timeliness of transfers dispatch in 
the regions was a guarantee of political stability 
because it had a strong connection with payment 
of wages for those employees who were working 
in the budget sphere.
Federal authorities did not have any wide 
public supporting in the process of the Russian 
economy reforming. That is why they tried 
to find common ground with narrow by the 
membership but politically significant «special 
groups of interests», including their most 
influential representatives in the structure of the 
State apparatus on the different levels. Reforming 
fixed adoption of political market formal frames 
whereas real hybrid of bureaucratic and political 
markets appeared [Kurbatova et al., 2005]. 
Federal and budget reforms (for instance, creation 
of the new administrative-territorial formations – 
federal okrugs, governors’ status changing, 
changing of the principle of Council of Federation 
forming, creation of the State council) leaded to 
the essential limitation of financial opportunities 
for the regional authorities, but at the same 
time significant part of their obligations were 
preserved. Thus costs to get subventions, State 
subsidies and transfers increased dramatically 
as well as transformation of process of resources 
redistribution on political-bureaucratic market 
happened. Process of institutional changes 
gradually becomes a center of competition in 
interregional relations. It is supposed that these 
changes will assist to develop native small and 
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medium business and to attract investments into 
regions economy.
Regional «Developmental Subjects»
Real regional «developmental subjects» are 
represented with regional authorities, regional 
parliament and regional companies that are 
susceptible to the innovations (i.e. companies of 
«Schumpeterian» type).
Legislative and executive authorities operate 
in common in the field of regional «developmental 
institutions» creation. Their object is to develop 
territory (region, kray or republic). Also they have 
political, administrative and symbolic capitals 
those are rare enough. It is supposed that these 
kinds of capital have mobilization potential that 
is non-commensurable with abilities of all other 
regional developmental agents.
In the context of regional «developmental 
institutions» creation these resources can be used, 
for example, in the process of laws adoption, 
which regulate their creation and functioning.
In the frames of regional «developmental 
institutions» formation and functioning main 
functions are fulfilled by the State managers1. 
These functions are the following:
advising: information accordance for • 
companies (potential residents, anchor 
residents, service companies) about 
creating «developmental institutions»;
coordinating: preparation of conception • 
of regional «developmental institutions» 
creation; regulation of interplay of 
all possible participants – regional 
developmental agents (business, institutes 
of higher education, scientific institutes, 
expert community and others);
negotiating: negotiation with potential • 
companies-residents and private 
investments attraction for project 
financing; lobbying of regional 
1 It is important to point out the fact that similar functions 
are fulfilled by the State managers in the frames of fed-
eral «developmental institutions».
Table 1. Comparative characteristics of «Federal Center – Regions» relations*
Analyzed 
parameters 1991 – 1998 («decentralization») 1999 – 2005 («recentralization»)
Federal Center 
bargaining 
position
Total weakening of bargaining position: 
dissociation of interests groups of supreme 
political elite and federal bureaucracy; 
deficit of political capital.
Total strengthening of bargaining position: 
consolidation of interests groups around 
the figure of the President; increasing of 
political capital.
Regions 
bargaining 
position
Total strengthening of bargaining position: 
consolidation of interests groups around 
the figures of regional leaders (Yu. Lugkov, 
М. Shaimiev, А. Tuleev); presence of 
independent political capital.
Total weakening of bargaining position: 
dissociation of interests groups of 
governors and deficit of political capital 
(actual dependence from presidential 
appointments).
Center of 
competitive 
relations 
between regions
Interbudget relations: regions-recipients 
aspire to get subsidies, subventions, 
transfers; regions-donors try to preserve 
profitable items of their regional budgets. 
«Exclusive» interests of regions lobbying.
Legislative activity: creation of conditions 
for development of small and medium 
business. Regional developmental projects 
lobbying.
Normative and 
legal base of 
interrelations
Absence of clear formal rules for 
interrelations. Bilateral agreements practice. 
Partial exit of regions out of federal legal 
field. Political differentiation of regions.
Abolition of bilateral agreements practice. 
Rigid bringing of regional legal acts in 
accordance with federal legislation. Political 
«equalization» of regions.
* This table is worked up by the author. Chronological frameworks: (1) 1991 – the USSR collapse and the beginning 
of the modern phase of federative relations; (2) 1998 – adoption of Conception of interbudget relations reforming 
in the Russian Federation; (3) 2005 – completion of the period of country «recentralization» policy.
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«developmental institutions» creation 
project on the federal level and federal 
resources attraction;
administering: regional resources • 
accumulation for project financing and 
creation of organizational structure of 
«developmental institutions»; construction 
and reconstruction of engineering and 
social units of infrastructure.
It is supposed that advising function is 
the most important because of the fact that 
information about possibility or intention to make 
some changes can be a potential source of private 
benefit for officials. In other words, it is simple 
signal that does not demand special co-ordination 
with higher levels of bureaucratic hierarchy 
about content and form of rules of regional 
«developmental institutions» functioning.
One more source of political rent extraction 
is formulating of rules that have polysemantic 
interpretation. For instance, initial interpretation 
of these rules that is unfavorable for entrepreneur, 
activates the latter for informal interplay with 
officials to change this interpretation (in this case 
symbolic capital, that bureaucratic apparatus has, 
is used in full measure).
It is crucial to note that the more lofty the 
position in the hierarchy of a particular bureau, 
and the more prestigious the bureau in the 
hierarchies of bureaus, the greater the weight on 
negotiating and advising and the less the weight 
on administration – the function that can be most 
readily delegated [Hartle, 1983]. Furthermore, 
officials aspire to achieve their private 
objects. This is demonstration of opportunism 
[Williamson, 1985]. Officials’ resource is the 
right to sign documents (for instance, to define 
form and order of keeping of technological park 
residents register). They can use this right in 
different degree according to the position in the 
bureaucratic hierarchy (the right to use so-called 
«administrative currency»). Form of realization 
of special function is a benefit that does not have 
any links with the results of officials’ activity 
(for instance, status position in the bureaucratic 
hierarchy, social status in society, prestige, career 
opportunities, opportunities of raising the level 
of skill and human capital increment and others).
Direct interplay of the State managers 
with companies that pretend to get the status of 
technological park residents causes the necessity 
to analyze their object and instruments to achieve 
this object.
Small and medium business is also interested 
in regional «developmental institutions» creation, 
especially in getting access to innovative business 
infrastructure on favorable conditions, as well as 
in «innovator rent» extraction that is the main 
object.
«Rent of innovator» is monopolistic 
surpluses profit of entrepreneur that stimulates 
new production development, for instance – new 
goods, services, technologies [Oleynik, 2000, 
p. 390]. This rent is extracted in competitive 
environment and has temporary character 
because monopoly is open and brings surpluses 
profit only in the initial period of a new product 
appearing on the market till its imitation 
realized by competitors. Organizational and 
managerial innovations are the main resources 
of «Schumpeterian» entrepreneurs. Such 
innovations are tightly connected with specific 
knowledge accumulation and these innovations 
are possible to introduce in any sector of the 
national economy.
However, it is crucial to note that not all 
entrepreneurs take aim at innovations producing 
of the «Schumpeterian» type. Thus their object 
is not in «innovative rent» extraction during 
the functioning of regional «developmental 
institutions». «Schumpeterian» type of 
entrepreneur is a rare kind that strives for inertia 
overcoming and tries to carry out radical changes 
via new possibilities creation, introducing of 
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innovations and using means of production 
differently (according to J. Schumpeter – «creative 
destruction»). That is why innovative activity of 
entrepreneurs may take on various forms. For 
instance, W.J. Baumol showed that entrepreneurs’ 
activity might have productive, unproductive 
(«rent-seeking») or destructive orientation 
according to the existing rules of the game 
[Baumol, 1990]. «Rent-seeking» entrepreneurs’ 
resource is financial funds that they use to lobby 
their interests. For these entrepreneurs political 
rent is realized in the form of adopted laws, 
decrees or resolutions that limit competition and 
allow getting monopolistic surpluses profit.
For instance, SWOT-analysis of project 
of «Kuzbass Technopark» creation, which 
had been carried out by consulting company 
«Strategy Partners», disclosed opportunities to 
extract political and innovative rents. Political 
rent can be received by officials and private 
companies that are «rent-seeking innovators» in 
the process of additional budgets funds attraction 
for construction and equipping new buildings, 
as well as in the process of Technological park 
buildings leasing that can damage innovative 
activity. On the other hand, disclosed favorable 
opportunities of the project, for instance private 
investors’ interests in the sphere of innovative 
opportunities of Technological park and regional 
venture fund formation, create opportunity to 
extract innovative rent by entrepreneurs who 
are interested in supporting and development of 
market competition.
Also it is necessary to organize effectively 
three-sided connection between regional and 
federal authorities and private-entrepreneurial 
sector in the frames of regional «developmental 
institutions» formation.
According to the implemented analysis of 
federal and regional «developmental subjects» 
compose the following table 2.
Political and institutional markets can 
be regarded as complementary mechanisms 
of «developmental institutions» creation and 
spreading in the Russian economy. Differences 
between these markets are the following.
Rules that are introduced via political 
market can bring benefit only for those players of 
Table 2. «Developmental Subjects»: Object and Instruments (Federal and Regional Levels)
«Developmental 
subject» Object* Instruments
Superior political elite
Development of the country 
territory; «incorporation» in the 
world economy.
Adoption of laws, decrees and resolutions 
that determine common strategy and 
directions of development.
Federal bureaucracy Developmental projects and 
programs realization.
Federal «developmental institutions».
Federal large-scale 
companies
Participation in wide-scale 
developmental projects; receiving 
various preferences.
Special interests lobbying in the frames of 
federal «developmental institutions».
Regional administration Development of the region territory. Regional «developmental institutions».
Regional parliament Development of the region territory.
Adoption of laws and decrees that regulate 
«developmental institutions» creation and 
functioning.
Regional companies of 
«Schumpeterian type»
Getting access to business-
infrastructure on favorable 
conditions, «innovator rent» 
extraction.
Realization of organizational and 
managerial innovations.
* It is crucial to note that there are private objects of «developmental subjects» (for example, corporative interest 
of federal bureaucracy). But its analysis is not the aim of the article.
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political market who follow these rules, whereas 
rules of economic behavior, which are introduced 
via institutional market, are considered to be 
favorable by economic agents themselves. That is 
why we can single out two absolutely different 
mechanisms of institutions spreading: (1) State 
coercion to use this or that institution; new 
institution introduction is realized via political 
market mechanism, (2) free-will acceptance of 
a new institution via institutional market; new 
institution is introduced by economic agents 
themselves [Tambovtsev, 1999].
An introduction of institutional innovation 
via political market mechanism is centralized 
because of the State (in the person of federal and 
regional authorities) formulates rules of economic 
behavior according to its own preferences. On the 
contrary, institutional market is the «platform» 
where permanent decentralized process of 
choice of different institutions (norms and rules 
of economic behavior) is realized by economic 
agents.
Resume
During «developmental institutions» 
formation it is important to take into account 
(1) its specificity: institutional changes are very 
prolonged along the time, (2) possible risks: 
aspiration for rent-seeking may appear instead 
of effective State stimulation. It is supposed that 
fundamental factor is correlation of bargaining 
positions of different special interests groups 
on political-bureaucratic market. Federal and 
especially regional authorities are the most 
consolidated groups with powerful bargaining 
positions and with its private objectives. That is 
why they can extract political rent in the process 
of «developmental institutions» creation and they 
can formulate the rules those are favorable for 
groups with narrow private interests.
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Субъекты развития и институты развития  
российской экономики  
(федеральный и региональный уровни)
К.С. Саблин
ГОУ ВПО «Кемеровский государственный университет» 
Россия 650043, г. Кемерово, ул. Красная, 6
В статье рассматривается проблема создания многоуровневой системы «институтов 
развития» в российской экономике. Выделены критерии и цели «институтов развития», а 
также выявлены группы, которые заинтересованы в их формировании.
Представляется, что группы интересов могут быть разделены на «агентов развития» и 
«субъектов развития». «Агенты развития» обладают ресурсами и инструментами, которые 
они используют в целях реализации нового потенциала экономического роста, в то время как 
у «субъектов развития» также должна быть сильная переговорная позиция и политическая 
воля, чтобы создавать избирательные стимулы для «агентов развития».
Особое внимание уделяется отношениям «Федеральный Центр – Регионы», предопределяющим 
особенности создания системы «институтов развития» в российской экономике. При 
этом важно принимать в расчет силу переговорных позиций групп интересов, которые 
взаимодействуют на региональном политико-бюрократическом рынке.
Ключевые слова: «институты развития», институциональные инновации, политико-
бюрократический рынок, символическая и административная формы капитала.
